That’s a form of capital controls, and while I understand and agree with the purpose, in practice it’s a net negative to do. I’ve considered some voluntaryist alternatives for this problem recently, and one of the best things I can think of is a “Coordinape redemption program” where a phase before settlement of bank and after give allocation takes place. It could vary quite a bit at this level, so the interaction is more important than the minutiae in this example.
Say BDAO Treasury earns $10k over the course of the month during a given coordinape round
We take $2500 of it and allocate to the coordinape redemption program
The month’s give have been allocated, and the intermediary phase begins:
Before receiving your bank, you “vest/stake” (pick the most appropriate term) if you want a portion of the stables in the redemption program.
You can allocate as much or as little bank as you want in this redemption
Bank allocated in this way is retained by the treasury, and not emitted
When all Bank allocations are in- Pro-rata settlement of the Stables based on bank contributed
Many of those who sell their earned bank do so for living expenses, and this creates a twofold solution: We mitigate sell pressure because those users have a new way to convert bank to stables at a sustainable rate, and we get an emergent ratio of Bank/Stables demand which can be analyzed to yield information about our compensation and earning rates.
This also mitigates the need for the above mentioned capital controls. It may not be a complete solution at our current revenue levels, but It gives us a revenue target in order to become a complete solution.
In terms of the minutiae on this strategy, I’d love to have some coordinated discussion about the best pathways to implement, as that’s all that’s really missing from adding this to the GSE compensation plan.