We can abolish quantitative quorum and move forward and iterate on it. There is no necessity to to stop until we can substitute a different quorum scheme.
IRL there is a few hundred years of experience that teaches that quorum thresholds should be set low like below 30%. I am reasonably certain even if quorum was reached the GSE process would have recommended a change.
The present quorum experiment did not achieve what is was intended to do ( whatever that was) and ironically was a victim of its own process. Ok we move on. Abolish.
Thanks for putting this together @samanthaj, seeing this not get quorum was a challenging setback.
I struggled with this one, but ultimately, I think it is CRITICAL that we honor the previous snapshot vote. Snapshot is the highest degree of consensus at the DAO, and I think invalidating it with a forum vote isn’t valid.
I think we have to work to meet quorum to disengage the governance quorum requirements. Or at least it is our responsibility to try.
If we track wallets to discord accounts to twitter accounts also we can stiffen sybil resistance because people would have to set up identities in multiple places but then are we breaching privacy by centralizing all that information?
@jakeandstake where’s the line when we start reducing quorum requirements?
Reducing it is basically just for convenience and ability to move quickly but at what point do we stop? Why would 70% be better than 80% when in a year we’d need 60% to get things passed?
This is an issue of direct democracy we have ongoing, it requires informed consent of all participants and that requires time and effort. In a world of limited time and infinite content (the internet) it’s very difficult to achieve that for a high % of participants, but lowering the threshold starts us on a slippery slope IMO.
This was posted before the revelation that mega-whales would be tapped to vote. My opinion comes from a place of execution. If we kept the quorum requirement and voter turnout stayed the same or continued to decline, we would not be able to get anything passed. Leading to the impotence of the DAO.
I’d rather see us backtrack on this requirement than see the DAO’s life come to an end.
re: the quorum threshold: in the community call today, it was revealed that the threshold was set at the most optimistic participation levels. In that light, previously, we had 0 quorum requirements and a simple majority. I think this is fine for the time being and we can let the GSEs propose changes to this.
Whew, trying to keep up with DAO governance is becoming a part time job. This is a problem in itself: we need a streamlined & digestible system to prevent voter apathy. But I understand that the quorum issue is a blocker.
For quorum, I believe we all agree that we need to move fast but also carefully. I think we’re wasting time, we should just honour the quorum, void the proposal, and resubmit adjusted to the current environment. But how we move past this issue is merely the appetiser for the main course.
I’ve tried to synthesize a few different approaches with my own thoughts, apologies if I missed some branching discussion and points on these themes:
Right now our tokenomics are hurting the same DAO community we are trying to build. Those who have the greatest opportunity to dedicate themselves to the DAO mission - part/full time DAO members - are typically in a position where they have to sell their governance power in order to make ends meet, to wealthy investors who are not close to the groundwork or community ideals.
“Those closest to the problem are closest to the solution, but often furthest from resources, influence, and power.”
I, for one, can’t wait for the A part of DAO. My proposed solution is that we grant proof of humanity NFTs when contributors hit L2, and code an invalidation/burn/alert into the smart contract when they are transferred. It would incentivise guest pass/L1s to be recognised by their peers and reach/maintain L2 status.
The chances of a Sybil Attack are thus extremely small: the perpetrator would have to uphold an additional identity for each governance seat they fraudulently obtain, and every day of involvement they would be at risk of discovery by other contributors.
If we go this route, we also have to discuss inactivity and thus removal of L2 status.
We would have to discuss incentives for becoming L1, because right now it would merely serve as “buying into the possibility” for reaching L2. If we extended voting from just L2 to L1, we’re selling governance power again.
We would have to consider direct selling of wallets. Pretty hard to sell a perceived identity and skillset though.
“I am, at the Fed level, libertarian;
at the state level, Republican;
at the local level, Democrat;
and at the family and friends level, a socialist.”
I believe that Meritocracy can work on the DAO level