Thanks @Icedcool for posting this announcement and link to the new Snapshot and the template. Should this announcement also clarify that this Snapshot is only available to tlBANK holders who minted before a specific date?
In this case, Bank token will not even have the most basic governance authority. I see that many proposals are on tlBANK Snapshot. This is equivalent to sidelining the people who hold Bank? Bank has no value at all. This is what I see as a newcomer. Why do we need to create a TlBank to disperse the governance of Bank? I have only recently paid attention to the community. Can anyone explain the reason to me?
For example, how do people who currently hold Bank get governance rights? I always feel that there is something wrong. Why can’t bank holders govern bankless DAO, but have to hold TLbank? New bank holders cannot participate in governance. Now the latest proposals I have seen are all on Tlbank, and everyone does not govern according to the amount of TLbank held. Everyone only has 1 vote. I feel that this indirectly weakens people’s demand for holding banks.
BANK still have governance authority, there is a separate snapshot for BANK Snapshot
tlBANK is the only token which allows for GRANTS authority, at the moment
One issue we have with BANK as the sole form of governance is that people could buy into the community at a cheap price during market downturns and then liquidate the work the community has been doing. This happened to many DAOs (including Rook, Nouns, Aragon) To mitigate against that we created another token which is not permissionless.
Exactly my point - why should someone who has no context be able to start voting day 1? Continue paying attention to the community and you will earn governance rights. Better yet, write a proposal to give yourself governance rights and try to get the community behind you.
According to the background you mentioned: In the case of a market downturn, in order to avoid bankless being liquidated by bank holders, tlbank was created to obtain the governance rights of banklessdao.
The current status and impact of the community: It seems that the community has been protected through centralization, but in essence, a minority of people have monopolized the governance rights through voting. It has damaged the rights and confidence of bank holders. The content builders of the community are important, but the market contributors who are willing to buy bank are equally important.
I don’t agree with some of your views. As you said: why should someone who has no context be able to start voting day 1? The governance rights granted by the constitution to bankless belong to the holders of bank, not tlbank. You have to understand that including other communities, those who hold governance tokens have community governance rights. In addition, the number of days of participation in governance has nothing to do with it, so I cannot agree with the logic of why a new participant with no background can participate in governance (bank tokens give the owner the right to use, not a certain person).
Why am I replying here: I paid attention to the bankless community in 2021. At that time, bankless dao was a well-known dao of web3. It was promoted on the Internet as a textbook for the development of DAO and was very popular. This year, because of some things, I paid attention to banklessdao again. I was surprised that the value of bank tokens was returning to zero, and a vibrant community was disappearing. Out of curiosity, I wanted to pay attention to what happened in the community. It seems that I have gradually seen some reasons. A. The economics of bank tokens are very poor, there is almost no empowerment, and the only governance right has been deprived. B. Community development lacks builders with ideas.
Finally, I personally hold bank tokens.
Wrong. tlBANK was created as an experiment to add time-locking to the naked ERC20. During an existential threat to the DAO, multisigners used this token to identify wallets who are value-aligned to the DAO.
Wrong. Contributors are more important than passive investors. Why? A community can exist without investors but not without contributors. This was recently proven for this community’s when the multisigners paused all grants.
Those governance rights still exist, and yet no one has posted a proposal to elect new multisigners nor shown any disagreement with the actions of the community so far. In fact we barely have any dissent on the forums or discord.
If anything, the actions taken have actually PROTECTED the value of BANK because we greatly reduced emissions of BANK.
If you don’t like the way things are going, post your own proposal to change it.
Wrong again.
BanklessHQ created a token with 0 tokenomics and barely contributed to the community. Then they came back 2 years later, rugged the brand that they gave to the community and called it a day.
On the other hand, community members created a society that has been exceptional at upskilling and on-boarding people to web3. Our alumni have jobs all over the web3 ecosystem. We have created thriving governance using 2 tokens (BANK and tlBANK) and continue to experiment and iterate with on-chain governance even when the founders of the community rugged us. Our affiliated projects continue to run, which you would know if you attended/listened to the latest community call.
TBH sounds like we are empowered and resilient to me.
Great, I look forward to your contributions!
If you are one of those tradFi « maximize token holder value » people, though, maybe this community isn’t for you.
To add, I think that the governance rights of the portal bank only exist before the snapshot on November 25. Then how do those who are willing to lock the bank and participate in community governance participate in community governance? Are the powers they should have been deprived? Your definition is to protect in a special community, so how long will this stage last? There is no clear duration limit yet.
Whilst I can’t comment on Bankless tokenomics, I can compare with capital structures of co-operatives
There has always been a distinction between economic participation vs control rights in cooperatives … eg golden shares. This is not often seen in west but asian firms quite often have dual class shares where the voting rights might be disproportionate to the actual face value or there are special restrictions on resale. This is imperfect refection of bicarmel legislatures which try to balance short-term popularism with long-term crown interests (doesn’t always work but that’s the theory). I see this in other DAOs which have protector or elders style provisions to stay true to the original constitution. It is up to the org to decide what are standard operational decisions (grant proposals allocations) vs metagovernance issues (structure of org). You have to realise that the alternative to a poison pill arrangement (hard to make sudden course correction) is a fork as seen in the case of Steem though the counter-factual of quiet quitting is less obvious … the hidden side of stasis. From a behavioural economics PoV, time-locking is a signal (xref handicap principle) in that it signals a long-term commit rather than a trading/transactional mindset. One is forgoing any staking or speculative short-term advantages. I refer you to the classic interpretation of voting versus weighing.
There are still a lot of issues with participatory governance … as others have observed, cliques or coalitions of interests can form which leads to reduced cost of bargaining / compromise … so long as the ideas are contestable and no oppression of minority viewpoints occurs, it should result in healthy competition and not religious schism.
