[TEMP CHECK] BanklessDAO Grants Reform

Governance
1

Summary

  • The Grants Committee has been dealing with several challenges that may be an existential threat to the DAO
    • The GC mandate is unclear
    • The GC has trouble attracting and retaining members
    • The seasonal funding process is difficult and contentious
    • There is no indication of how GC is performing
  • This temp check seeks DAO feedback on potential solutions to the above problems
    • Defining a GC and Department purposes in the Constitution
    • Adjustment of GC quorum and compensation
    • Defining who should be able to request grants
    • Moving projects to ad-hoc funding (not seasonal)
    • Reducing scope and adopting new tools for guild funding

Background

Grants Committee has existed since Season 1, and has gone through several iterations since its inception. The current form of the Grants Committee is governed by Section 4.6 of the BanklessDAO Constitution, and has broad authority to set the DAOā€™s funding processes (which are detailed in the Grants Committee Handbook).

Having served as Grants Committee Lead for 3 seasons, I (and every other GC member) have received feedback from many different DAO members and groups on how we could improve the grants process. Due to the complexity of the system, it has so far been impossible to reconcile all feedback into an actionable plan. In addition, any changes to the process could result in negative contributor sentiment, which could lead to the loss of contributors.

It is for this reason that the Grants Committee seeks to gather consensus from the DAO. This Temp Check will present many potential changes to our grants process, along with pros/cons of each change. Please read through it carefully and vote thoughtfully. The Grants Committee will reconcile feedback gathered here (and elsewhere) to improve the grants process to the best of our ability.

Note: The polls below are all open, and will be used to gauge the DAOā€™s sentiment, not make final decisions. The GCā€™s goal is to optimize long-term pursuit of our mission, not short-term contributor sentiment.

Challenges

This section lists challenges the Grants Committee is facing, prompting some of the questions in the Temp Check.

CHALLENGE: The mandate of the Grants Committee is unclear

Everything stems from purpose, and a lack of a clear purpose means different GC/DAO members have different ideas of what the GC is meant to accomplish. This leads to confusion, arguments, and different GC cohorts aiming at different goals.

The current Grants Committee purpose (as stated in Section 4.6.1 of the BanklessDAO Constitution) is: ā€œThis Committee is responsible for vetting all funding proposals and ensuring funded organizational units provide ongoing transparency.ā€

  • This purpose appears simple on the surface, but it makes no mention of WHY the Grants Committee exists (i.e. why are we disbursing funding at all?) which means every Grants Committee member has their own criteria when voting for funding proposals
    • The lack of ā€œwhyā€ also means itā€™s difficult for the Grants Committee to set KPIs for ourselves, which is unacceptable when we ask every other DAO group to submit KPIs for themselves.
  • This purpose gives the GC a lot of RESPONSIBILITY, but the AUTHORITY is vague.
    • Example: Some people have said they donā€™t believe that ā€œvettingā€ is the same as approving/rejecting requests (i.e. they believe the GC isnā€™t allowed to reject funding proposals that have passed forum quorum)
    • Example: Funding proposals also come with the inherent expectation of permission to use the Bankless brand, but this isnā€™t an authority given to the Grants Committee.

I believe that setting a clear purpose will help bring direction to all other challenges the DAO is facing.

CHALLENGE: The Grants Committee has difficulty attracting and retaining members

  • We didnā€™t achieve quorum for the entire month of August - this means that we could not vote or take action on any proposals.
    • We currently have 5 active members, which means every single member needs to attend every single meet to achieve quorum this season (unlikely).
  • Fewer GC members available means more work for those who are left, worsening the problem.
  • Very few members of Grants Committee ever seek re-election.

Being a member of the Grants Committee is a difficult, time-consuming, complex job. We need to take steps to reduce the effort related to being a GC member or increase the compensation to attract more talent. This challenge is an existential risk to the DAO. Our Constitution doesnā€™t allow us to distribute funding without a GC quorum.

CHALLENGE: The seasonal funding process is labour-intensive, time-consuming, and contentious

  • It takes ~6 weeks to run our current seasonal funding process, which means we are running our seasonal funding process for HALF of the season.
  • During this time, GC members are under a great deal of stress as they try to provide guidance to projects and accountability to the DAO.
  • Itā€™s easy for some DAO units to escape scrutiny during this process, leading to uneven treatment and funding.

Itā€™s an impossible task to deep-dive into 25-30 projects, especially when GC members are dropping out mid-season. Usually GC members and DAO contributors have good intentions, but the time-limits and stress lead to negative outcomes and vibes, which is the opposite of what we actually want to achieve through our grants process (i.e. progress + fun). The good news is that there is a lot of room to improve here.

CHALLENGE: Thereā€™s no indication of how the Grants Committee is performing

Is this cohort of GC better than the last? Are we any closer to achieving BanklessDAOā€™s mission after disbursing tens of millions of BANK? Is our grants process improving? Itā€™s not possible to easily answer these questions. Partially this is due to not having a strong, long-term purpose (i.e. north star), and partially this is because the GC has no reporting requirements.

The Grants Committee is a funded DAO unit, just like any other. If we donā€™t hold it to the same standard as other DAO units, we cannot systematically improve it.

Temp Check

Grants Committee Purpose/Mandate

A draft purpose statement: ā€œThe Grants Committee disburses BanklessDAO resources to encourage long-term pursuit of our missionā€.

  • This sets Grants Committee up to disburse all resources, not just BANK (e.g. the Bankless brand).
  • States WHY we are disbursing grants, i.e. to pursue mission. This will make it easier to set KPIs for Grants Committee.

POLL - What is the Grantā€™s Committeeā€™s purpose?

  • Current: ā€œThis Committee is responsible for vetting all funding proposals and ensuring funded organizational units provide ongoing transparency.ā€
  • Proposed: ā€œThe Grants Committee disburses BanklessDAO resources to encourage long-term pursuit of our missionā€
  • Something else (Iā€™ll comment below)
0 voters

Grants Committee Operations

Currently the GC needs a quorum of 5 people. This has been difficult to achieve in the bear market. Instead, how about setting a quorum based on a simple majority of elected members? (i.e. 4/7, 4/6, 3/5, 3/4)

POLL - What quorum should the Grants Committee use?

  • Current: 5 people
  • Proposed: Simple majority of elected members
  • Abolish quorum (i.e. no minimum number of GC members required to disburse funds)
  • Something else (comment below)
0 voters

One way we could encourage more people to apply for the Grants Committee is to increase the compensation. This could take the form of BANK or stables. To ensure that GC members are earning their compensation, we could tie compensation to specific deliverables in the grants process.

GC current compensation is 3,846 BANK/week for reviewers and 6,250 BANK/week for leads, plus a 250K BANK seasonal coordinape.

POLL - Should we increase Grants Committee compensation?

  • Yes, GC should get more BANK
  • Yes, GC should get more BANK and/or stables
  • No, keep the current compensation structure
  • No, they should be compensated less than they make now
0 voters

General Funding Criteria

During a discussion about member-leveling, one approach is to strengthen L1/L2 rather than restrict Guest Pass. One way to do that would be to require that people be L1/L2 to submit proposals. This would not only make L1/L2 more attractive, it would also ensure people who submit proposals are somewhat value-aligned with BanklessDAO.

POLL - Who should be able to submit grant proposals?

  • Guest Pass and above
  • L1 and above
  • L2 and above
  • It should depend on how much BANK is being requested
  • Something else (comment below)
0 voters

Project Funding

The seasonal funding round is essentially a shortcut for DAO units to get funding, and was introduced in S1 before we had a difference between guilds/projects/departments. When projects are guaranteed funding every season, they are incentivized to use up BANK before the end of the season. In fact, average BANK/project consumption has increased by 49% since Season 6.

In the An Idea for Team Taxonomy forum post, I introduced the idea of ad-hoc project funding (as opposed to seasonal funding for projects). This would greatly reduce the amount of work GC has to do around seasonal funding time and also require projects to gain DAO consensus every time they ask for funding and in turn encourage them to utilize their BANK more effectively and concentrate on outcomes. This has been shown to work in projects that decided against seasonal funding, like Bounty Board, Governator, and Bankless Card.

POLL - Do you think projects should move to ad-hoc grant requests?

  • Yes!
  • No!
  • Something else (comment below)
0 voters

Guild Funding

Member-Based Guild Funding was rolled out in Season 6, and in the 3 seasons since, weā€™ve seen a dramatic decrease in guild/department funding. While guild/department funding went up by 3.7% from S5->S6, in Season 9, guild+department funding is 26% less than S6 highs. Guild funding by itself is 45% less than S6. From this perspective, member-based guild funding has been a success.

Unfortunately, although it was also meant to reduce the amount of work the GC had to put into the seasonal funding process, it has actually increased the work significantly. Many guilds have indefensible/undocumented ā€œactive memberā€ counts, which requires GC members to do time-consuming deep-dive audits to figure out how many members a guild truly has. Some bDAO community members are part of 4+ guilds, meaning the DAO is paying guilds 4x to keep these single members around.

One solution to this issue is to reduce the scope of guilds. Instead of rewarding guilds for active members, we could give them a fixed weekly amount to be a ā€œlanding placeā€ for new BanklessDAO members, and thatā€™s all. Guild members who wanted to create educational or onboarding efforts could seek funding from GC as projects. This would greatly reduce the work of the GC and also encourage guilds to teach members how to go through the grants process.

Another solution could be to adopt decentralized tools for guild funding. For instance, we could use Gitcoinā€™s grants stack or Snapshot to allow members to signal support for guilds and disburse funding using a simple formula rather than audits.

POLL - How should we change the guild grant process?

  • Reduce the scope of guilds
  • Adopt decentralized tools
  • Both of the above
  • None of the above (comment below)
0 voters

Department Funding

Departments were instantiated as part of Member-Based Guild Funding, and are defined in Section 4.2 of the Constitution as ā€œthe essential operational units of BanklessDAOā€.

There has been little scrutiny of Departments. Their S9 funding is 6% higher than S6, but we actually added a new Department (Department of Governance), so, in general, the change in spending has not been bad even without scrutiny.

That being said, just like the Grants Committee itself, itā€™s difficult to understand the progress and status of these DAO units. Although they provide seasonal accountability posts, bDAO members have different ideas of what Departments are responsible for. I believe that this is due to a lack of defined purpose. You cannot improve without a goal.

I propose that each Department has a purpose defined in the Constitution. This would give each Department direction and scope and allow them to set and report on KPIs to the DAO.

POLL - Should we define a purpose for every Department in the Constitution?

  • Yes
  • No
  • Something else (comment below)
0 voters

Next Steps

  1. Gather DAO feedback (this temp check).
  2. Reconcile feedback within the Grants Committee and document changes to the grants process.
  3. Ratify the above documentation with a GC vote.
  4. Notify the DAO of changes before the next grants round starts (Nov 11).
  5. Create bDIPs for any required changes to the Constitution (i.e. quorum, compensation, department mandates).
8 Likes
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This is a fascinating if not disheartening statistic.

Is it possible be more specific on the weekly amount? Will it be contingent on size? Will it be contingent on pass efforts?

What would this benefit in the area of apathetic voting?

I believe the constitution currently defines departments. Iā€™m not sure of the current make up of departments warrants codification in the constitution UNLESS the definition of each department is literally set in stone (do departments in turn have greater responsibility than guilds, if a department doesnā€™t hold up its purpose does it get disbanded?)

I like this.

1 Like
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I totally agree that GC needs to have a ā€œNorth Starā€ - something that is used to be measured to see if the GC team is being successful and improving upon/meeting goals. I do like the proposed mandate, but would ask for a clarification of what is the definition of ā€œresourcesā€, if not just the dispursement of BANK.

4

Can you also provide a little more context for me regarding why it takes half the season to run the seasonal funding process? (Iā€™m not familiar with the process). Is it just because itā€™s based upon the limited number of GC reviewers, back-and-forth feedback from the requester dept/project/guild? Is there any discussion (and maybe thatā€™s in the North Star metrics) on how to improve the process for both the submitter and the reviewer (GC) to make it easier/faster, etc?

1 Like
5

I think it should definitely be based upon a simple majority (quorum) based on who is there from the GC at the time of the vote. Otherwise, if your quorum is 5 people (i.e. 100%) how can get any votes completed (and without delay).

1 Like
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A fixed weekly rate for guilds would not count size or past efforts. Unsure of the weekly amount, but it should be enough to cover hours to run a weekly guild meeting, welcome new members, maintain presence in Discord/notion, and report back to the DAO (forum, Community Calls).

Iā€™m not sure what you are asking here, but one would think that if guilds have active members, they would be able to get those members to participate (especially if guild funding is at stake). If guilds donā€™t have people who are willing to participate then they arenā€™t really fulfilling their mandate and would receive less funding. It feels like incentives are aligned here - what do you think?

The Constitution defines Departments as ā€œthe essential operational units of BanklessDAOā€, but thereā€™s no documented reasoning as to why each of these units is ā€œessentialā€. Documenting a Department purpose in the Constitution will not only create clarity on a Department mandate, it will also create a mechanism to create/remove Departments (i.e. write a bDIP).

Resources would include BANK and all other tokens in the Treasury, as well as IP including brand.

For instance - who says Bankless Card has the right to the Bankless brand? What happens if it takes off and no longer needs BANK - how do we keep alignment with projects in the long run? My feeling is that it is the brand that keeps us aligned. BanklessDAO delegates the brand to sub-entities, and when they are successful, they can give back to the DAO for continued use of the brand.

IP is a pretty powerful concept as well. Currently IP is one of the biggest things we are creating. Without an IP policy or holder, Bankless projects can take their IP (developed using BANK as compensation) and restrict the DAO from the benefits. This is exactly what the DEGEN project did. If the Grants Committee is empowered to manage this IP, we can set up a structure where IP created is used to the benefit of creators as well as the DAO.

It takes half a season because there are typically 20-30 grant requests to review in-depth by the GC. GC members are typically spending <5 hours a week on committee work, and there is a lot of depth and back-and-forth.

RE: discussion - this is the discussion on how to improve the process. This entire TEMP CHECK is meant to open this discussion and improve the process.

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You would need to make an effort to delve into why. If you are serving to improve the bDAO mission.

If you do not, fair enough. But I donā€™t buy it. It will depend on how you truly involve every person with token weighted voting which is a huge cause of apathetic voting.

Aka, throwing tools at a problem makes the problem worse if you donā€™t endeavor to solve the human layer.

Which I wonder if not focusing on the human layer could be one of the issues why we are here.

1 Like
8

ā€¦again Iā€™m not really sure what youā€™re saying here. Can you please clarify?

To restate my position: the GC and the DAO have some existential threats around the seasonal funding process. One way to reduce the amount of time/effort the GC puts into seasonal grant requests would be to use decentralized tools to determine part of guild budgets. One example of this would be to have guilds direct members to signal support for them in some sort of Snapshot/Gitcoin setup. This would align guild mandates (i.e. attract and retain talent) with action (active members signal support for a guild).

It sounds like you are saying this is unfair or not human, and I am having trouble understanding why. It seems like a pretty small thing to ask guild members to vote for a guild once a season.

3 Likes
9

If they are not engaged with the DAO as a whole or not knowledgeable on how to vote or how to even interact with the funding processes (which takes time and work that this process MAY not serve)

You have misunderstood by focusing on the fact that you think Iā€™m not calling it human.

Also, never said it was unfair. Iā€™m saying make an effort to people to see which tool works the best so every person has the chance to be informed.

10
  • If they arenā€™t engaged with the DAO, then why should they get a say on funding?
  • If they are engaged in guild, but not the DAO, then the guild is incentivized to let them know that there is a vote that requires their attention.
  • If they arenā€™t knowledgeable on how to vote, the guild could teach them how to vote (in fact it would be in the guildā€™s best interest to do so.

Againā€¦it feels like incentives are aligned, doesnā€™t it?

Thatā€™s the plan! This is a TEMP CHECK - whatever path we ultimately decide will need more spec work.

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It is a temp check that leaves too much info out to validate whether the entire plan is a good idea.

That does not mean itā€™s not a great idea, but it does leave a lot to be desired

If they arenā€™t engaged to a particular persons liking (this is a subjective measurement)

But they are to the best of their ability AND they are trying to understand what to do.

Throwing a bunch of tools with no background or plan of action will get you around the same realm of the member based activity funding situation; great ideation, not so great execution.

So what Iā€™m saying to you (which falls in line with your last bullet point) have the grants committee or this reform have a bullet proof (to the best of its ability) plan to give people the chance to be informed so they can vote for what they are interested in.

So it has work to go to become aligned.

12

Iā€™m in favour of this approach, as Iā€™ve said on other posts a few times. I believe guilds are great as a safe landing place, which we could ensure is consistent through the provision of BANK for weekly discussion facilitation and/or a welcoming committee, plus a little bit of admin. Guild members could work together to produce a shared set of resources relevant to their area of interest and that way those welcoming and facilitation roles could be shared rather than held by one or two people for the whole season. The idea would be to make guild meetups interesting enough that people want to come along for the vibes and discussion around common interests.
I donā€™t know exactly how it plays out, but Iā€™d like to see us try this course of action with Guild funding.

4 Likes
13

Couldnā€™t vote on this because I believe some questions from this temp check should be answered before this is addressed. For instance, if projects are moving to ad-hoc funding, it implies less work on the GC front. Same can be said for reducing guild funding scope.

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It will be interesting to explore how we can loop tlBANK into this discussion because these days, I see value-alignment tied to holding tlBANK

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From what you have written in this temp check, Links, it sounds like the GCā€™s greatest issue is the stress level (and I believe you mentioned outside influencers) who make it difficult for GC to 1) complete their responsibilities, 2) want to re-run for the position, and 3)attracting new people to run for the GC. It appears that even though itā€™s one of the most primary functional groups with bDAO it is also one of the most thankless. Yes, I believe that a combination of increasing compensation + giving more power (quorum change and North star metrics and purpose) will provide your current GC with more empowerment and provide a place within bDAO to really make good change.

Totally agree with that, @links . I didnā€™t think of the IP of the brand, but youā€™re right, bDAO is really creating a strong IP that provides reach for spin-offs of projects, like Bankless Card and others, as well as internal bDAO projects. Without the strong IP (and the protection of the IP by the GC), then these spin off projects and internal projects have no leverage for success.

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Thatā€™s what I figured, @links regarding the need for the temp check as a way to improve the process (and empower the GC). Totally supportive of this temp check.

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nice, i support the intent of this measure but havenā€™t read it fully yet.

@links have you seen the OBRA post yet? [Discussion] Safe DAO Resource Allocation Model (OBRA) - Phase 0: Pre-SEPs - Safe Community Forum

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I did! I posted my response here: [Discussion] Outcomes-based resource allocation framework (OBRA) - #4 by links - Phase 0: Discussion - Safe Community Forum

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Great initiative @links!

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Iā€™ve chosen the heavy-lift ā€˜Something Elseā€™ option here, and so must begin my wall of text.

The proposed setup, simple disbursement duties, seemingly reduces the Committee to essentially a multi-sig. This moves toward manageable scope, but sacrifices any real incentives for a prospective member to accept the responsibility of being on the GC in the first place. It also provides little value to the DAO as a whole, since we have a multisig that could already perform these tasks.

The current setup, vetting all requests and ensuring transparency on subgroups, seems like an over-extension and is demonstrating itself difficult to scope and execute. To say that the GC must ensure something another group is responsible for and has agency over feels like weā€™re setting our GC reps up for failure.

In shaping my write-in ā€œpurposeā€ of the Grants Committee, Iā€™d start by prioritizing the reasons we want to have a Grants Committee in the first place:

  • I think itā€™s valuable to all DAO members to ensure there is a dedicated team reviewing all requests for funding so that we arenā€™t misusing our resources or leaving our grants process open for exploitation.
  • I think itā€™s valuable to grant requesters to have a structure for requests and to know that their request will be reviewed by a dedicated team, rather than waiting on forum activity to get around to it whenever or guessing on submission requirements.
  • I think itā€™s valuable to individuals interested in serving on the Grants Committee as an opportunity to have a closer look at what gets funded, a louder voice in these reviews, and more exposure to the web3 grants requesting process generally.

I donā€™t have all the answers here, but my gut-check says these two presented choices arenā€™t the best options we can come up with.

Iā€™d rather see us pull back on the scope of responsibilities and/or re-define them before simply moving to increase the compensation for whatā€™s being described as an unclear scope.

Having to enforce transparency on subgroups is difficult to define, scope, and achieve. We may be asking too much of the Grants Committee, here. What about starting with something like these for scoped mandates :point_down:

  • Create and/or maintain easy-to-use templates and clear application procedures
  • Review one seasonā€™s worth of funding requests and provide recommendations for/against funding
  • Fulfill administrative duties and internal recordkeeping tasks, as needed

ā€¦and then building a fair compensation package to meet those needs? This would leave the actual vote to support or decline each proposal up to the whole DAO through either a forum vote or a Snapshot vote.

I voted ā€œL2 and aboveā€ and, again, seemed to be an outlier. Iā€™ll explain my reasoning for this one as well.

I like the idea that an L2 should have to champion a project requesting funding, or should at least vouch for L1s like our L2 nomination process currently requires. L2s are socially-confirmed contributors and have a vested stake in ensuring our resources are allocated responsibly. Worst case scenario, a group of L1s with a good idea donā€™t know an L2. Networking, baybeeee! Weā€™ve got that big here.

Yes.

I think batched Seasonal Funding, as the primary method of subgroup funding, creates a sense of entitlement, disincentivizes larger DAO discussion, and reduces the focus on value creation.

Any group that exists in the current season will be almost certain to get a disbursement of replenishment funds for next season, as long as they submit a seasonal funding request into the already-overloaded seasonal review process. If the GC approves it, the disbursement gets added to the package of all approved disbursements. At that point, DAO members that disagree with any of the determinations of the Grants Committee must vote against all funding disbursements, including their own, by voting against the full funding package on Snapshot.

Feels like Moloch. :smiling_imp:

Automatic Member-Based Guild Funding, with its use-it-or-lose-it policy of subtracting leftover funds from the seasonal ask, incentivizes guilds to optimize for member count above all else and to spend every BANK token that they get granted before next season, in order to max out next seasonā€™s ask.

This encourages a feedback loop of onboarding to onboard because if we onboard more people to the guild weā€™ll have more money to onboard people to the guild. But why are we onboarding people? What would we have them do once onboarded? And what incentives exist for those newly onboarded members to stick around? Are we just paying people in BANK to ā€œbeā€ in a guild?

Feels like Moloch. :smiling_imp:

I picked both [reduce scope and adopt decentralized tools] here. But, again, I think there are more paths to take than the two that were given as choices in this poll.

Moreso than additional decentralized tools being implemented, I think Iā€™d rather see a more decentralized approach to funding decisions using our existing bDAO ecosystem tools. The longer we make the list of tools required to participate in governance here, the greater the challenge of maximizing participation.

This makes a LOT of sense to me. Guilds as talent pools, rather than talent machines. Projects apply separately for funding to encourage responsible use of grant funds and to increase transparency and engagement.

Our current mandate for guilds to ā€œattract, retain, and up-skill talent, and nothing elseā€ seems to need refinement, as well. What incentive does the DAO have to be paying people to teach other people skills, while also paying the learner people to learn the skills? Thatā€™s a lot of expense. Does the DAO see any social, financial, or impactful return on this expense? Are these new members grouping up to create new projects and initiatives? Or are they just sticking around to collect micropayments because the system perpetuates disbursement of micropayments for sticking around for micropayments? :smiling_imp:

If we want to retain guilds as spaces for aggregating talent, and I think we should, realignments in our incentive structures will be required.

Instead of the DAO paying guild members to learn and the DAO paying guild leaders to teach, what if the guild members pay the guild leaders for their teachings via a seasonal token mint, course price, or similar? In this way, the learnerā€™s primary motive is to get knowledge from the teachers instead of BANK from the Treasury. Theyā€™re personally committed to- and invested in- their own success.

Want to join Quilting Guild? Mint this soulbound-but-expiring quilt NFT with BANK tokens! Members must own the NFT to receive access to the teachings and resources of that guild, until it expires. The revenue from mints would be used to compensate teachers for lessons and guild leaders for administrative/bookkeeping tasks.

If the teachers arenā€™t compelling enough to learn from, or there are no students willing to pay for quilting knowledge, the DAO isnā€™t on the hook to keep funding the Quilting Guild, just because the mandate says upskill and the guild still exists.

Additionally, the teacher would have greater incentive to level-up engaged and personally-committed students instead of managing a churn of BANK farmers monetizing their free time with Discord alts.
If the teacher is excellent, I would then see an opportunity for the DAO to partially incentivize that personā€™s retention, perhaps through an additional Guild reward. This could become a blueprint for a talent pipeline for Bankless Academy or the Education Department.

Spicy bits incomingā€¦ :hot_pepper:

Looking more closely at incentive alignment, what incentive does the DAO Treasury have to fund guilds at all?

  • Does the DAO even need guilds, if weā€™ve defined departments as the ā€œessentialā€ subgroups?
  • It seems we like having at least some guilds, right? What makes these ā€œnon-essentialā€ guilds attractive enough for us to fund every season? What is it about them that we feel is valuable?
  • Does the DAO benefit by having a variety of guilds? Should we be incentivizing population growth within guilds?
  • Are the members of these guilds expected to or empowered to contribute yield of some kind back to positively impact the DAO Community or DAO Treasury? What does the DAO get by funding guilds? Is the DAO actually accumulating successful students and onboarding them to successful projects that go on to generate sustainable revenue for the guild or DAO treasuries?

A guild scope like a ā€œlanding placeā€ feels like a far more manageable place to start and a reasonable level to fund. Check in, say hello, network, job hunt, help fellow members if you have skills or knowledge you can share, and get involved in discussions.

  • Need sustained and structured education? :point_right: Check out YouTube or any of the sources of free university courses offered online.
  • Have you come up with a great idea that needs funding? :point_right: Spin up a project and submit a funding request.
7 Likes